We give a formal de nition of what it means for a system to \tolerate" a class of \faults". The de nition consists of two conditions: One, if a fault occurs when the system state is within a set of \legal" states, the resulting state is within some larger set and, if faults continue occurring, the system state remains within that larger set (Closure). And two, if faults stop occurring, the system eventually reaches a state within the legal set (Convergence). We demonstrate the applicability of our de nition for specifying and verifying the fault-tolerance properties of a variety of digital and computer systems. Further, using the de nition, we obtain a simple classi cation of fault-tolerant systems and discuss methods for their systematic design.
Introduction
Fault-tolerant computing has traditionally been studied in the context of speci c technologies, architectures, and applications. One consequence of this tradition is that several subdisciplines of fault-tolerant computing have emerged that are apparently unrelated to each other. These subdisciplines deal with speci c classes of faults, employ distinct models and design methods, and have their own terminology and classi cation 10, 26, 39] . As a result, the discipline itself appears to be fragmented.
Another consequence of this tradition is that veri cation of fault-tolerant systems is often based on implementation-speci c artifacts|such as stable storage, timeouts, and shadow registers|without explicitly specifying what properties of these artifacts are necessary. Such veri cation is imprecise and hence unsuitable, especially for safety-critical systems.
To redress the problems described above, some e orts have been made in the last decade. These e orts have mainly focussed on classifying fault-tolerant systems, and have yielded two noteworthy classi cations. One is based on a distinction between the notions of faults, errors, and failures: faults in a physical domain can cause errors in an information domain, whereas errors in an information domain can cause failures in an external domain 1, 6, 27] . (Unfortunately, these notions are subjective: \what one person calls a failure, a second person calls a fault, and a third person might call an error " 13] .) The other is based on what type of fault is tolerated, for example, stuck-at, crash, fail-stop, omission, timing, or byzantine faults 19, 30, 32, 36] .
A few e orts have also been made to formally de ne and verify system fault-tolerance 14, 29, 30, 32] , albeit with limited scope. More speci cally, these e orts have considered systems that recover from the occurrence of faults and terminate properly. In other words, they have considered systems whose input-output relation masks faults. Alternative forms of fault-tolerance that do not always mask faults have rarely been considered. Such forms of fault-tolerance ensure the continued availability of systems by repairing faulty system parts or by correctly restoring the system state whenever the system exhibits incorrect behavior due to the occurrence of faults.
One form of fault-tolerance that does not always mask faults is self-stabilization 33]. While self-stabilization was rst studied in computing science in 1973 15] , and its application to fault-tolerance was strongly endorsed in 1983 25] , it is only in the last few years that concerted e orts have been made to relate self-stabilization to fault-tolerance 1 7, 9, 11] . Even so, self-stabilizing systems are mainly being designed to tolerate arbitrary transient faults, whereas they can be designed to tolerate a variety of fault types 4, 24, 40, 41] .
In summary, a survey of the literature reveals that there is a well-de ned need for (i) a uniform de nition of fault-tolerance, and (ii) methods for designing and verifying system fault-tolerance independent of technology, architecture, and application.
Overview
In this paper, we rst give a uniform de nition of what it means for a system to tolerate a class of faults. Our de nition consists of two conditions: one of closure and another of convergence.
To motivate the closure condition, let us observe that a well-established method for verifying fault-free systems is to exhibit a predicate that is true throughout system execution 16, 22] . Such an \invariant" predicate identi es the \legal" system states and asserts that the set of legal states is closed under system execution. Following this method, we require that for each fault-tolerant system there exists a predicate S that is invariant throughout fault-free system execution.
Next, we observe that faults|be they stuck-at, crash, fail-stop, omission, timing, or byzantine|can be systematically represented as actions that upon execution perturb the system state 14]. In other words, even when the e ect of a fault is not transient, but is permanent or intermittent, the fault can be represented as an action. For example, consider a wire that can be permanently stuck at low voltage. Such a wire can be represented by the following program. Let in and out be two variables that range over f0; 1g, and let broken be a boolean variable. The correct behavior of the wire can be described by a program action that sets out to in provided that out6 = in holds and the state of the wire is :broken. That is, out6 =in^:broken ! out := in If a fault occurs, the incorrect behavior of the wire can be described by the program action that sets out to 0 provided that the state of the wire is broken. That Having thus represented faults as actions, we next characterize what happens when a system is perturbed into an illegal state due to the execution of a fault action. We require that for each fault-tolerant system there exists a predicate T that is weaker than S and is invariant under the execution of system and fault actions. In other words, we require that once fault actions start executing, the system state necessarily satis es T. Thus, T de nes the extent to which fault actions can perturb the legal states during system execution.
The requirement that predicates S and T exist constitutes the closure condition. We are now ready to motivate the convergence condition. Once fault actions stop executing, the system can achieve progress only if it is restored to a state where S holds. Therefore, we require that every fault-free system execution, upon starting from any state where T holds, eventually reaches a state where S holds. This requirement constitutes the convergence condition.
We de ne fault-tolerance formally in the next section. We then go on to show how the fault-tolerance properties of digital and computing systems can be speci ed, veri ed, and designed independent of technology, architecture, or application. In particular, the issues we consider include how to use our de nition to: classify the fault-tolerance of a system, verify that a system is fault-tolerant, verify that a system is fault-intolerant, prove there is no system that both meets a speci cation and is fault-tolerant, design a system that both meets a speci cation and is fault-tolerant.
We emphasize that reported here are only a few of the applications that we have developed over the last three years. A detailed report of these applications appears in 2].
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we give a formal de nition of what it means for a program to be fault-tolerant and present a formal classi cation of fault-tolerant programs. Using the de nition, we illustrate: in Section 3, how to verify that a program is fault-tolerant; in Section 4, how to verify that a program is fault-intolerant; in Section 5, how to prove that there is no fault-tolerant program that meets a given speci cation; and in Section 6, how to design programs to be fault-tolerant. Finally, we discuss some questions raised by our approach in Section 7 and make concluding remarks in Section 8. 
Two-Phase Commit Protocol
As its name suggests, this protocol consists of two phases. In the rst phase, each process casts its vote and sends the vote to a distinguished \coordinator" process c. In the second phase, the coordinator reaches a decision based on the votes received, and broadcasts the decision to all processes.
Process c has three actions. In the rst action, c casts its vote, enters the second phase, and starts waiting for the votes of other processes. In the second action, c detects that all processes have voted Yes, and reaches a Commit decision. In the third action, c detects that some process has voted No or has stopped, and reaches an Abort decision.
Each process j other than the coordinator has three actions. In the rst action, j detects that c has voted and casts its vote. In the second action, j detects that c has stopped and reaches an Abort decision. In the third action, j detects that some process has completed its second phase and reaches the same decision as that process has.
For each process j, let 9 ph:j be the current phase of j; ph:j is 0 initially, 1 after j has cast its vote, and 2 after j has reached a decision, d:j be (depending upon the current phase) the vote or the decision of j; d:j is true if the vote is Yes or the decision is Commit and false if the vote is No or the decision is Abort, up:j be the current status of j; up:j is true if j is executing and false if j is stopped.
Remark on programming notation:
We use \?" to denote nondeterministic choice. Thus, \x :=?" means that x is assigned a nondeterministically chosen value from its domain. The domain of each parameter is nite.
We adopt the following binding power of logical connectives (in decreasing order):
, ( , 6 Thus, p_q ):r equivales (p_q) ) (:r). We sometimes use blank spaces as delimiters. Thus, p _ q):r equivales p _ (q )(:r)):
The Two-phase protocol is described formally in the following program, along with the set of faults it tolerates. 
Proof
To show that program Two-phase is F-tolerant for S, we are required to exhibit a state predicate T that satis es the three conditions in De nition 3. In this case, we let T to be S itself. It therefore remains to show that S is closed in Two-phase as well as in F.
S is closed in Two-phase :
For arbitrary j, we show that each conjunct of S is preserved under execution of program actions starting from a state where S holds.
The rst conjunct of S is preserved: by executing the rst three actions, since they falsify ph:c = 0; by executing the fourth action, since it is not enabled when ph:c = 0; and by executing the fth and the sixth action, since they truthify ph:j =2^:d:j.
The second conjunct of S is preserved: by executing the rst action, since it truthi es (8j : ph:j 6 = 2 _ :d:j); by executing the next two actions, since they falsify ph:c = 1; by executing the fourth action, since it truthi es ph:j 6 =2; and by executing the last two actions, since they truthify :d:j.
The third conjunct of S is preserved: by executing the rst action, since it is not enabled when ph:c = 2 nor does it establish ph:c = 2; by executing the second action, since it truthi es (8j : ph:j 6 = 0^d:j); by executing the third action, since it truthi es :d:c; by executing the next two actions, since they are not enabled when ph:c = 2; and by executing the sixth action, since it truthi es ph:j 6 =0^d:j.
The last conjunct of S is preserved: by executing the rst action, since it is not enabled when ph:c = 2 nor does it establish ph:c = 2; by executing the second action, since it truthi es d:c; by executing the third action, since it preserves (8j : ph:j 6 =2 _ :d:j); by executing the fourth action, since it is not enabled when ph:c=2; and by executing the last two actions since they truthify :d:j. 
Remarks
Existing two-phase commit protocols require three modes of execution: a \normal" mode is used when faults do not occur, a \termination" mode is used when the coordinator stops, and a \recovery" mode is used when a process restarts. In contrast, our protocol does not require di erent modes of operation.
Proofs of correctness of existing protocols rely heavily on implementation details, such as stable storage (nonvolatile memory) and timeouts. In contrast, the proof of our protocol does not rely on implementation details. Finally, the guards of some actions in our protocol access variables that are updated by more than one process. Furthermore, it is assumed that, for each action, the evaluation of its guard and the execution of its assignment statement is instantaneous. These \high atomicity" assumptions are not necessary: the program remains fault-tolerant even if (i) the variables of di erent processes are accessed separately during the evaluation of the guards, and (ii) the evaluation of the guards is done separately from the execution of the assignment statements. 
Example: Data Transfer Protocol
Speci cation
An in nite input array is to be copied to an in nite output array. Items from the input array are to be sent by a sender process to a receiver process via a bidirectional channel. Faults may lose channel messages.
Sliding-window Protocol
In the sliding-window protocol, the sender process associates an identi er with each item it sends. When an item is received by the receiver process, it is accepted provided its identi er is the one expected; if accepted, an acknowledgement of the item is sent to sender. There can be at most W ?1 unacknowledged items at any time, hence a log W-bit identi er su ces.
Process sender has three actions. In the rst action, sender sends an item provided it has sent less than W ?1 items that are currently unacknowledged. In the second action, sender receives an acknowledgement and prepares to send the next item. In the third action, sender detects the loss of messages and resends all the items that are currently unacknowledged.
Process receiver has two actions. In the rst action, receiver sends an acknowledgement for the item last received and starts waiting for the next item. In the second action, receiver receives an item, and accepts it if the identi er is the one expected.
Let cs be the channel from sender to receiver, cr be the channel from receiver to sender, ns be the number of items sent by sender, nr be the number of items received by receiver, na be the number of items whose acknowledgement has been received by sender, bs be the log W-bit identi er of the item to be sent next, br be the log W-bit identi er of the item to be received next, ba be the log W-bit identi er of the item to be acknowledged next, rr be a binary valued control variable maintained by the receiver, and be, respectively, addition and subtraction modulo W, and & be sequence composition.
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The sliding-window protocol is described formally in the following program, along with the set of faults it tolerates. Executing the rst action of receiver preserves the second conjunct, and does not modify the variables in the remaining conjuncts. Executing the second action of receiver preserves cs=br::bs 1, br=(nr mod W), and na nr^nr ns, and does not modify the variables in the remaining conjuncts.
T is closed in Sliding-window :
Similar to the proof of S is closed in Sliding-Window.
T is closed in F :
Actions in F do not add new messages in cs or cr nor do they update any other variable.
T converges to S in Sliding-window :
Consider an arbitrary state where T holds. We consider three cases for this state: (a) cs = br::bs 1, (b) some item in cs has identi er less than br, and (c) no item in cs has identi er less than br, but some item in br::bs 1 is missing in cs.
Case (a). S holds at the state.
Case (b). Due to fair execution of actions of receiver, all items in cs with identi er less than br will be received by receiver, thereby yielding a state where case (a) or (c) apply.
Case (c). Due to fair execution of actions of receiver, br will eventually be the identi er of the rst item missing in cs. Subsequently, as long as an item is missing in cs, br and nr will not be updated and items received from cs will not be accepted. Since na nr, eventually na will no longer be updated and the rst action of sender will no longer be enabled. Hence, eventually cs will be empty, thereafter rr will be 0, and cr will be empty. Therefore, the third action of sender will be executed, yielding a state where cs = ba::bs 1 and cr = hi holds. Due to fair execution of actions of receiver, cs will eventually be the sequence br::bs 1, yielding a state where case (a) applies.
Since S is not closed in F, the strongest solution Ts is weaker than S and, hence, Slidingwindow is nonmasking fault-tolerant. Also, it is straightforward to show that true does not converge to S and, hence, that Sliding-window is local stabilizing fault-tolerant. 2 
Remarks
The guard of the third action of sender involves detecting the global state of the system. One way to implement this detection is to use a timer and to timeout if no acknowledgement is received within the time taken to append W messages to cs plus the maximum roundtrip delay of a message. The byzantine agreement algorithm is described formally in the following program, along with the set of faults it tolerates. Only the rst conjunct in S names the b variables and the rst conjunct is preserved upon execution of an action in F; hence, S is closed in F. This method of witnesses can be simpli ed when verifying special kinds of fault-tolerance such as masking or global stabilizing fault-tolerance. Observe that for verifying that a program is not masking fault-tolerant, it su ces to exhibit the witness states b and c, 21 and to show that S does not hold at c. Likewise, for verifying that a program is not stabilizing fault-tolerant, it su ces to exhibit a witness computation that has no su x where S holds.
Example: A Delay-Insensitive Circuit
In this example, we consider circuit timing faults that are caused by delays in signal propagation. We rst verify that a delay-insensitive circuit, the Muller C-element, tolerates timing faults in the arrival of its input signals 34]. We then exhibit an implementation of the C-element that uses a 3-input majority function and verify the well-known fact that the implementation is masking fault-tolerant for one type of timing fault but not masking fault-tolerant for another type.
Speci cation 32]
A C-element with boolean inputs x and y and a boolean output z is speci ed as follows: We show that program C-element is F-tolerant for S, where S is true. It is straightforward to show that program C-element satis es its speci cation for S. ( We observe: First, program C-element satis es the speci cation properties (i) and (ii) at every state. Second, every computation of C-element, upon starting from any state, eventually reaches a state where z is set to the value that both x and y have; thus, C-element also satis es property (iii).)
Since every state is legal, the closure and convergence conditions are trivially met and, hence, program C-element is F-tolerant for S. In particular, it is both global stabilizing and masking fault-tolerant.
Implementation
Consider a majority circuit with three boolean inputs x, y, and u and one boolean output v. To implement the C-element using this majority circuit, it su ces to connect v to z and feedback v to u 34]. This corresponds to replacing the last action of program C-element with the following two actions We show that C-maj-element is masking F1-tolerant for a speci c set of states, but is not masking F2-tolerant for any plausible set of states.
Proof
Let S = ((z 6 v) ) (x 6 z^y 6 z))^((u 6 v) ) (x 6 z^y 6 z^u z)).
We show that C-maj-element is masking F1-tolerant for S.
We observe: First, speci cation properties (i) and (ii) are satis ed at every state in S. Second, every computation of C-maj-element that starts at a state in S eventually reaches a state in S where z is set to the value that both x and y have; thus, C-maj-element also satis es property (iii). And third, S is closed under the execution of actions in C-maj-element and F1. Hence, C-maj-element is masking F1-tolerant for S.
Let S 0 be any non-empty set of states that is closed in C-maj-element and each of whose states satisfy speci cation properties (i), (ii) and (iii). We show, using the method of witnesses introduced at the beginning of this section, that C-maj-element is not masking F2-tolerant for S 0 . In particular, we exhibit a state b that satis es S 0 and a state c that does not satisfy S 0 and that is reachable from b by executing actions in F2.
We observe: Since (iii) is satis ed at every state in S 0 , there exists a state d in S 0 where x z^y z holds. Let e be the state reached from d by executing the rst action, then the fourth action, and then the fth action of C-maj-element. In e, the variables u; v; x; y; and z all have the same value. Let b be the state reached from e by executing the rst action and the fourth action of C-maj-element starting from e. Since S 0 is closed under execution of actions in C-maj-element, it follows that b satis es S 0 .
Let c be the state reached from b by executing the third action and then the rst action of F2. In c, u x^x 6 v^v y^y z holds. Now, if the fourth action and then the fth action of C-maj-element are executed starting from c, (ii) is violated. Since each state in S 0 satis es (ii) and S 0 is closed under execution of actions in C-maj-element, it follows that c does not satisfy S 0 . Hence, C-maj-element is not masking F2-tolerant for S 0 .
Proving Impossibility of Fault-Tolerance
In this section, we illustrate how our de nition can be used to prove that for a given speci cation and a given class of faults there is no program that both satis es that speci cation and tolerates that class of faults.
In keeping with the method of witnesses presented in the previous section, we observe that to prove that there is no program that both satis es some speci cation SP and tolerates F, it su ces to exhibit three witnesses: a state b that is in the domain of execution of all programs satisfying SP, a state c that is reachable from b by executing actions in F, and a computation of every program satisfying SP that starts at c and has no su x satisfying SP.
Several results in the literature on impossibility of fault-tolerance 28] can be proven using this method, including the well-known impossibility of distributed consensus with one faulty process 20]. Some of these impossibility results involve special kinds of faulttolerance such as masking or global stabilizing fault-tolerance. Observe that for proving impossibility of masking fault-tolerance, it su ces to exhibit the states b and c, and to show that c does not satisfy SP . Likewise, for proving impossibility of global stabilizing fault-tolerance, it su ces to exhibit a witness computation that has no su x satisfying SP .
Example: Mutual Exclusion
We prove a new impossibility result using the method outlined above. Our impossibility result concerns programs for mutual exclusion which exhibit the following fault-tolerance property: upon starting from an illegal state, their execution necessarily reaches a state where no further execution is possible. Such programs for mutual exclusion are desirable because their \bad behavior" does not persist inde nitely.
More formally, consider a program p whose intended domain of execution is S. We say that p halts on failure i the following two conditions hold.
p has global stabilizing fault-tolerance with respect to S _ TR, and :S converges to TR, where TR is the state predicate denoting all states of p where no further execution is possible.
Consider, further, programs whose variables can be partitioned so that variables in each partition are written by actions in one process only. We say: an action in process j is a read action i it reads a variable that is written in some action of a process other than j; an action in process j is a write action i it writes a variable of j that is read in some action of a process other than j. Program p is read{write i none of its process actions is both a read and write action. Consider a nite, rooted tree. It is required to design a stabilizing program in which, starting from a state where all tree nodes are colored green, the root node initiates a di using computation. The di using computation then propagates from the root to the leaves, coloring the tree nodes red. Upon reaching the leaves, the di using computation is re ected back towards the root, coloring the tree nodes green. And the cycle repeats.
Let c:j be the color of node j, and let sn:j be a boolean session number that is used to distinguish \j has not started participating in the current di using computation" from \j has completed participating in the current di using computation". Also, let P:j be the parent node of j in the tree (hence if j is the root then P:j is j, else P:j is the unique node from which there is an edge to j in the tree).
We postulate that when all j are colored green, all j have the same session number.
Hence, to distinguish \j has not started participating in the current di using computation" from \j has completed participating in the current di using computation", it su ces that j toggles the value of sn:j whenever j starts participating in a new di using computation.
We can now characterize S as follows : in the current di using computation, each j satis es one of the following four conditions. (i) j and P:j have both started participating , (ii) j and P:j have both completed participating, (iii) j has not started participating whereas P:j has , or (iv) j has completed participating whereas P:j has not. That is, S (8j :: R:j) , where R:j (c:j =c:(P:j)^sn:j sn:(P:j)) _ (c:j =green^c:(P:j)=red) .
Let us consider each R:j as a separate constraint in S and design the following convergence action to reestablish R:j if it is violated:
:R:j ! \update c:j and sn:j to establish R:j"
Observe that since the nodes are organized in a tree, every computation of the convergence actions eventually reaches a state where S holds. Observe also that there is more than one way to update c:j and sn:j so as to establish R:j. For example, the statement \c:j; sn:j := c:(P:j); sn:(P:j)" could be used or the statement \if c:(P:j)=red then c:j := green else c:j; sn:j := green; sn:(P:j)" could be used. Before we commit to any of these choices, let us design closure actions that preserve each R:j constraint.
For initiating a di using computation at the root node, we consider the closure action c:j =green^P:j =j ! c:j ; sn:j := red ; :sn:j For propagating a di using computation from p:j to j, we consider the closure action c:j =green^c:(P:j)=red^sn:j 6 sn:(P:j) ! c:j ; sn:j := c:(P:j) ; sn:(P:j)
For re ecting the di using computation from the children of j to j, we consider the closure action Any broad-based methodology such as ours raises several questions. Below, we answer some of the questions that our methodology has raised and discuss the rationale for some of the design decisions that we made in the course of this work.
While our de nition of fault-tolerance speci es that all executions of a fault-tolerant program eventually reach a legal state, it does not specify how quickly the executions reach a legal state. Is our de nition therefore too weak to be useful?
In de ning fault-tolerance, we have deliberately chosen to separate the concerns of correctness and e ciency. To this end, our de nition speci es correctness |viz, that convergence to legal states occurs in nite time| but does not specify e ciency |viz, the rate at which convergence to legal states occurs.
Nonetheless, the rate of convergence can be deduced from the proof of convergence. For example, letting a round denote a minimal sequence of steps where each process executes a step, and observing that the total number of items in cs and cr cannot exceed W, we can deduce from our proof of T converges to S in Sliding-window that, starting from a state where T holds, a state where S holds is reached within 3 W rounds.
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Is it necessary that execution of program actions be fair?
The programs presented in this paper are correct even if the execution of program actions is not fair. More speci cally, the programs are correct under the assumption of minimal progress; i.e., if there exists an enabled action, then some enabled action is executed.
We have nonetheless assumed fairness for two reasons. First, some useful programs require fairness to satisfy our de nition of fault-tolerance. And second, proofs of convergence are sometimes simpli ed by assuming fairness, as is the case for our proof of T converges to S in Sliding-window (see Section 3.2).
Since faults actions can only perturb program state, how can we capture permanent faults? intermittent faults? faults some number of which can be tolerated, but more cannot?
Consider, for example, our discussion of the Byzantine Agreement problem in Section 3.3. In that discussion, executing a fault action causes a process to permanently change its mode of operation from Reliable to Unreliable. Thus, even though the fault actions by themselves only cause state perturbations, the e ect of those state perturbations on the behavior of processes is permanent. (A similar argument holds for intermittent faults.) Furthermore, in the same discussion, we show that program Byzantine can tolerate up to N faults |but no more| by restricting the guards of the fault actions so that the fault actions can execute at most N times.
Is our de nition of fault-tolerance applicable to probabilistic programs?
Yes, provided we replace the convergence requirement with a probabilistic convergence requirement; i.e., a requirement which ensures that all program executions upon starting from a perturbed state eventually reach a legal state with probability one.
How can we reason about the fault-tolerance of program interfaces?
A program interface speci es the program behavior that is observable by some environment. This speci cation consists of a set of program variables and a set of constraints on how these variables may be updated 38].
In our approach, reasoning about interfaces is simple: Associated with each interface of a program p is some state predicate R that is closed under program execution. An interface is fault-tolerant with respect to some set of fault actions F i p is F-tolerant for R.
Since only some of the program variables may be observed by the environment, it is often the case that the state predicate R (corresponding to the interface) is weaker than the state predicate S (corresponding to the intended domain of the execution). Thus, it is often the case that while p is not masking fault-tolerant with respect to S, p o ers an interface R that is masking fault-tolerant. 8 
Conclusions
In this paper, we have given a formal de nition of what it means for a system to be fault-tolerant. The de nition consists of a safety requirement, closure, and a progress requirement, convergence. It is both general (in that it expresses the fault-tolerance properties of digital and computing systems) and uniform (in that it does not depend on the type of fault considered).
In addition, we have developed a formal framework for reasoning about fault-tolerant systems. The framework comprises methods for specifying, classifying, verifying and designing system fault-tolerance. Due to its formal nature, the framework enables reasoning that is independent of technology, architecture, and application considerations.
In future work, we plan to further develop the framework along the following lines: (i) To illustrate how to augment a program to make it fault-tolerant; (ii) To illustrate how to implement a program while preserving its fault-tolerance; (iii) To develop methods for reasoning about the fault-tolerance of real-time programs; and (iv) To replace the nondeterministic interleaving semantics considered here with more general program semantics.
